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Abstract 
This article sketches an analytical framework to account for new patterns of global 
governance. We characterize the emergent post-liberal international order as a new 
age of hybridity, which signifies that no overriding set of paradigms dominate global 
governance. Instead we have a complex web of competing norms, which creates new 
opportunities as well as major elements of instability, uncertainty and anxiety. In the 
age of hybridity, non-Western great powers (led by China) play an increasingly 
counter-hegemonic role in shaping new style multilateralism – ontologically 
fragmented, normatively inconsistent, and institutionally incoherent. We argue that 
democracy paradox constitutes the fundamental issue at stake in this new age of 
hybridity. On the one hand, global power transitions seem to enable ‘democratization 
of globalization’ by opening more space to the hitherto excluded non-Western states 
to make their voices heard. On the other hand, emerging pluralism in global 
governance is accompanied by the regression of liberal democracy and spread of 
illiberalism that enfeeble ‘globalization of democratization.’   
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Introduction 
 
A decade has elapsed since the onset of the global financial crisis. The crisis has 
brought about fundamental changes in global politics and economy. The stagnation in 
advanced democracies and the concomitant rise of non-Western great powers 
triggered an intense debate about the future of liberal international order (Acharya, 
2018; Flockhart, 2016; Beeson and Li, 2015). The liberal institutionalist school 
suggests that liberal democracy and free market economy, which became enshrined in 
existing international order, will prevail despite certain governance problems and 
institutional discontents (Ikenberry 2018, 2011; Deudney and Ikenberry, 2018, pp. 18-
19). Ikenberry (2018), for instance, claims that China’s rise can be accommodated 
within the liberal multilateral framework since it does not have strong incentives to 
overturn the current system (also see Xinbo, 2018). Other scholars, on the contrary, 
argue that non-Western great powers such as Russia and China are already “shaping 
the lineaments of an alternative world order” (Sakwa, 2018; also see Sakwa, 2017) 
and investing in new governance models in defense of ideational and institutional 
pluralism and genuine multilateralism in international affairs (Flockhart, 2016; 
Acharya, 2018). The new emergent order, beyond the transformation of material 
distribution of power within international system, are built upon alternative 
conceptions of political representation, interest intermediation structures and 
developmental paradigms underpinning different forms of state-market relations 
(Bremmer, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2016; Acharya, 2017; McNally, 2012).  
 
There appears a quasi-consensus among scholars from different theoretical traditions 
that the international order is shifting rapidly. However, the properties and potential 
outcomes of the ongoing transformations remain a matter of intense controversy. The 
objective of this article is to sketch an analytical framework to account for emergent 
patterns of global governance. We characterize the current stage of international order 
as a new ‘age of hybridity’ with no overriding set of paradigms predominantly shape 
global governance. Rather, we have a complex web of competing norms, which 
creates new opportunities as well as unprecedented challenges, generating major 
elements of instability, uncertainty and anxiety in international politics.  
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In this new age of hybridity, non-Western great powers (China in particular) play an 
increasingly counter-hegemonic role in shaping new style multilateralism – 
ontologically fragmented, normatively inconsistent and institutionally incoherent. 
Although China does not actively aim to export its illiberal model of economic 
development, also known as the Beijing Consensus (Ramo 2004, Yağcı 2016; 
Ambrosio, 2012, p. 395; Beeson and Li, 2015, p. 94), the luster of its political 
economy paradigm as an alternative to neoliberalism influences a growing number of 
countries thanks to China’s emphasis on flexibility, no strings attached policy and 
individual experimentation (Bremmer, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2016). The target states are 
increasingly trying to learn and replicate key features of Chinese model of 
authoritarian capitalism as a fundamental aspect of the Beijing Consensus (Bremmer, 
2010, p. 6). John Williamson (2010, p. 1), who coined the term ‘Washington 
Consensus’, notes that “a major impact of the crisis has been to discredit Western 
views of development […] and to fortify what has sometimes been referred to as the 
‘Beijing consensus’ instead.” Further space has been opened for China, as the U.S. 
under Trump has adopted “America First” strategy forsaking its global leadership role 
by loosening its explicit commitment to the liberal foreign policy principles (Walt, 
2018, p. 9). At the same time, however, given its present stage of development, China 
is neither capable nor willing to perform an alternative hegemonic role (Nölke, 2015; 
Laïdi, 2014). Hence, the age of hybridity is open to co-operation on key economic 
issues, but also prone to significant conflicts in the technological, political, and 
security realms. This article argues that core issue at stake in the age of hybridity 
appears to be democracy paradox. On the one hand, post-liberal era witnesses the 
‘democratization of globalization’ by opening more space to hitherto excluded non-
Western states in global governance. On the other hand, the emerging pluralist 
tendency at the global arena is not accompanied by ‘globalization of democracy’ at 
the state-level, which counterbalances the former trend.       
 
This article is organized along the following lines. The rise of China and the challenge 
of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ are discussed in section 2. This is followed by a stylized 
comparison of Washington norms, dominated the previous phases of globalization 
and Beijing norms, which has become influential, if not predominant during the 
course of the previous decade. Section 4 discusses the emerging nature of 
fragmentation in the age of hybridity. We argue that processes of fragmentation, in a 
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multitude of different forms, have become a critical feature of the post-GFC era. 
Section 5 unpacks democracy paradox as key issue at stake in the age of hybridity. 
We first discuss the benign aspects of the age of hybridity, which is likely to 
democratize global governance in this new phase of globalization. This discussion is 
counterbalanced, however, in section 6 where we highlight the weaknesses associated 
with new forms of global governance in the post-GFC. The final section concludes 
the article. 
 
The Rise of China and the Challenge of the Beijing Consensus 
 
The remarkable re-emergence of China to the position of a truly global power in 
recent years has attracted widespread international attention. China’s phenomenal rise 
as a quasi-hegemonic actor involves the challenge of the ‘Beijing Consensus.’ The 
term, however, proves controversial (Li and Wang, 2014; Kennedy, 2010; Beeson and 
Li, 2015; Ambrosio, 2012). The rise of China presents a set of unconventional policy 
principles and opens up developmental space for many developing nations, whilst at 
the same time fundamentally challenges the established western-led neoliberal 
governance paradigm associated with ‘the Washington Consensus,’ and its augmented 
version ‘the post-Washington Consensus’ (Ban and Blyth, 2013; McNally, 2012). 
 
Beijing Consensus can be defined as the projection of Chinese model of authoritarian 
capitalism, also referred as ‘state capitalism’, to global governance as an alternative to 
democratic capitalism (Nölke, ten Brink, Claar and May, 2015; McNally, 2018). The 
Chinese model of capitalism represents a distinct variety with its emphasis on state-
permeated corporate relations, indicative industrial planning, strategic use of state 
fiscal resources and financial statecraft, and highly personalized network of capital 
accumulation (McNally, 2012, p. 744-5; Nölke, ten Brink, Claar and May, 2015, pp. 
543-545). The rise of China and the growing challenge of the Beijing Consensus raise 
deep questions concerning the relationship between successful economic development 
and pluralist democracy. Although in its specific form the Chinese brand of capitalism 
differs from the experience of the East Asian developmental states, it still sits very 
much in the same tradition in respect of the active role of the state in promoting 
industrial transformation and shaping market dynamics along with geopolitical 
autonomy from the West (Breslin, 2011). That being said, Chinese model of strategic 
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capitalism is also different from the statist import-substitution industrialization 
strategies implemented in the developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s as it 
embraces open markets and integration with global economy (Nölke, ten Brink, Claar 
and May, 2015, pp. 543; also see Bresser-Pereira, 2011). It’s important to emphasize, 
however, that China’s openness to transnational investment is based on an active 
bargaining process with transnational companies “over the specific terms of market 
entry” with Chinese state’s long-term strategic priorities to foster “home-grown 
technology and standards” (Strange, 2014, pp. 68-70). Therefore, as Strange (2014) 
documented, the “gated globalization” policies that Chinese government adheres to 
are essentially different from predominant liberal varieties of capitalism in terms of 
the organization of state-market relations, foreign trade and transnational investments.  
 
China’s state-permeated industrial transformation, underpinned by a stunning ten 
percent average annual growth over the last three decades, has given a benign face to 
the Beijing Consensus (Nathan, 2015; Foa, 2018). As a matter of fact, the rise of 
China has dramatically expanded the developmental space for many countries in the 
global South, effectively challenging the dominance of the North and Northern-
dominated Bretton Woods institutions. Projects such as the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) 
and new institutions in which China plays an overriding role such as Shanghai Co-
operation Organization, the New Developmental Bank and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank all carve out space for many other developing countries (see section 
5). An especially attractive feature of the emerging Beijing Consensus is China’s 
flexible understanding of conditionality, with references to a “no strings attached 
approach” being frequently used to describe the Chinese model (Li, Brødsgaard and 
Jacobsen, 2010, p. 304; Woods, 2008).  
 
The Chinese success has lent credence to the notion that successful capitalist 
transformation can be accomplished in a highly authoritarian political environment. 
The Chinese model is thus particularly attractive not only to established autocratic 
regimes such as those in central Asia, but also to majoritarian ones with growing 
illiberal tendencies in the European periphery (Monck and Foa, 2018) such as the 
cases of Hungary and Turkey, where the political leadership looks explicitly to the 
Chinese example as an alternative to Western style of development (Öniş and Kutlay, 
2019a; Öniş, 2017). For instance, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban explicitly 
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stated his ambition to “build an illiberal state” by pointing China and Russia as a 
source of emulation (The Budapest Beacon, 2014). Several Eastern European 
countries are now looking at Jinping’s China as new economic and political partner 
(Öniş and Kutlay 2019b). China is increasingly making its presence felt in wider 
Europe through its trade and investment linkages. According to Bloomberg data, 
“China has bought or invested in assets amounting to at least $318 billion over the 
past 10 years [in Europe] – 45 percent more China-related activity than the U.S” 
(Tartar, Rojanasakul and Diamond 2018). The future development of China is 
therefore immensely important as a potential co-hegemonic power capable of 
projecting its role model capabilities through global reach of the Beijing Consensus. 
 
The central question that arises at this point is whether China too will follow the 
typical East Asian pattern associated with the previous experiences of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, namely, rapid industrial transformation that leads, over time, to 
political liberalization and eventual consolidation of a liberal democratic regime. The 
South Korean experience is particularly striking. In a similar fashion to present-day 
China, the early phase of the Korean model was associated with a highly centralized 
authoritarian regime (Öniş, 1991). Yet South Korea has gradually managed to break 
away from its authoritarian past. In economic terms, it has been one of the few 
countries, which have been able to overcome the middle-income trap. In terms of 
regime type, it has managed to consolidate liberal democracy thanks to regular 
rotations of power and strong political pluralism..1 Will China follow the classic path 
of the original trio of the East Asian developmental states or will it deviate 
fundamentally from this original pattern? It’s obviously a huge question with dramatic 
implications for the future of the international order in a post-hegemonic age and the 
fortunes of liberal democracy on a global scale.2 It is certainly possible – although not 
probable in the short run – that Chinese-style authoritarian capitalism would 
experience pressures for political liberalization due to social and economic difficulties 
associated with falling growth rates and rising income inequality that eventually 
unleash popular unrests (Snyder, 2017, pp. 82-83). 
 
An alternative scenario, which seems more likely at present, is that the regime will 
prove to be highly resilient (Foa, 2018). If the Chinese government is able to 
accomplish reforms to maintain the momentum of economic growth, from which 
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large segments of society will benefit, it is highly likely to sustain its legitimacy and 
to prevent pressures for significant political liberalization. This scenario suggests that 
the Chinese model of authoritarian state capitalism has an in-built capacity to 
reproduce itself successfully over time. Which option is likely to prevail is of major 
scholarly interest not only in terms of its massive practical importance for China and 
its people but also – through the appeal of the Beijing Consensus in both its benign 
and malign forms – for political elites elsewhere increasingly looking at China as a 
key reference point for the pursuit of their own future development (Nathan, 2015). 
 
A Prelude to the Age of Hybridity: Washington vs. Beijing Norms 
 
How does the rise of Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism inform the emergence 
of a new equilibrium in global governance? In this section we propose a three-stage 
periodization of contemporary globalization to contextualize some of the salient 
features of the new era, which call the ‘age of hybridity.’ In the post-GFC, China and 
BRICS emerge as increasingly important actors and contest the dominance of the U.S. 
and other core Western powers (Öniş, 2017; Öniş and Kutlay 2019b). What we 
increasingly observe is a world characterized by the absence of a hegemonic power 
upholding a “tight” international developmental regime (Babb and Chorev, 2016).  
 
A key aspect of this new age, is the absence of a dominant set of norms, but 
competing ones, which co-exist and challenge one another. The clash of norms opens 
up new opportunities for more pluralistic patterns of globalization and carves out 
precious space for emerging countries. At the same time, on the other hand, it creates 
a new set of political and economic challenges. It is true that Beijing Consensus is a 
contested term in the literature. Kennedy (2010) argues that it is imbued with 
inconsistencies and misrepresentations that fall short of being a coherent model (also 
see Naughton, 2010). That being said, it poses an alternative to both original and 
augmented versions of neoliberal paradigm. The increase of Chinese influence and 
the emergence of alternative political economy paths in the post-GFC, therefore, 
deserve particular attention. This section juxtaposes three phases of contemporary 
globalization to better understand the distinctive features of the Beijing Consensus.  
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The first phase in our three-stage typology is ‘the age of Washington Consensus,’ 
which constituted the dominant paradigm during the 1980s and 1990s. Its central 
element was a strong belief in hyper-globalization policies and unfettered free 
markets to ensure sustained economic growth, which, in turn, would ‘trickle down’ 
and improve the welfare of wide segments of society (Williamson, 1990; for a 
critique see Rodrik, 2012). The key actors involved in promoting the key principles 
associated with neo-liberal economic policies such as trade liberalization, 
privatization, and financial deregulation were the key Bretton Woods institutions (the 
IMF and the World Bank) operating under U.S-led international order (Stiglitz, 2002; 
Frieden, 2007). During the 1990s, the global North (U.S., western Europe and Japan) 
was in a solid position in terms of their economic credentials. The U.S. enjoyed a 
period of rapid economic growth in the 1990s, which continued up until the 2007 
crisis. Despite 9/11 attacks and geopolitical uncertainties associated with the invasion 
of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. economy managed to grow at 3.3 percent on an 
annual basis without any interruption.3 The EU, the other key constituency of the 
liberal international order, appeared to be at the peak of its transformative capacity 
with its confidence boosted through a combination of ‘deepening’ – that is, the launch 
of single currency – and ‘enlargement’ – that is, admission of ten new members in 
2004 (Leonard, 2005; Öniş and Kutlay 2019b). Japan found itself in a phase of 
relative stagnation; but this inertia occurred in an environment of high per capita 
income, which was the product of high growth accomplished in previous decades. In 
retrospect, the end of the cold war strengthened the confidence of the dominant liberal 
core, as alternative paradigms of state-market relations exhausted (Fukuyama, 1992).  
 
In the age of Washington Consensus, the crises were predominantly associated with 
the global semi-periphery. A number of key emerging markets experienced 
subsequent shocks in a new era of financial globalization due to the unfettered short-
term capital flows. Almost every year a major crisis occurred in one of the leading 
emerging markets (Turkey and Mexico, 1994; Argentina, 1995; the Asian financial 
crisis, 1997; Russia, 1998; Brazil, 1999; Turkey and Argentina, 2001) (Rodrik, 1997; 
Haggard, 2000; Öniş and Aysan, 2000; Wade and Veneroso, 1998). As a result, the 
single-minded neo-liberal paradigm came under serious challenge for two basic 
reasons. First, liberalization of capital accounts without adequate institutional and 
macroeconomic safeguards appeared to generate economic crises with devastating 
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consequences (Stiglitz, 1999; Crotty, 2009; Öniş and Şenses, 2005, p. 267-268). 
Second, the optimist views about distributive benefits of growth failed to materialize. 
The economic growth in countries encouraged to adopt neoliberal agenda remained 
sluggish throughout the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, Latin America, “which tried 
harder than any other part of the world to live by orthodox [Washington Consensus] 
rules,” experienced dismal economic performance with -0.8 percent annual average 
growth during 1980s and just one percent over 1990s (Rodrik, 2007, p. 6). Also, neo-
liberal restructuring processes in several economies were associated with high degree 
of income inequality (see figure 1).  
Figure 1. The share of top 1 percent in pre-tax national income (% of total income, 1980-2015)  
  
Source: World Inequality Database, authors own figure. 
Note: Data for Brazil available for 2015 only. 
 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis, in this context, appeared to be a turning point that 
enabled fundamental questioning of neo-liberal principles and soul-searching in  
Bretton Woods institutions – the IMF and the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1999; Thirkell-
White, 2005). This, in turn, led to the advent of a new paradigm in early 2000s, an 
augmented version of neo-liberalism, known as the Post-Washington Consensus 
(PWC).4 The new PWC paradigm was based on two central pillars (Öniş and Şenses, 
2005; also see Thirkell-White, 2005). The first element concerned the importance of 
strong macroprudential regulatory institutions supervising the financial sector. It 
became a conventional wisdom in the post-2000 that without robust regulatory 
agencies such as strong competition authority and bank regulatory agencies, 
5
6 6
7
10 10 10
16
6
13 13
21
13
19
20 20
28
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Denmark China UK India Germany South
Africa
USA World Brazil
1980 2015
 10 
liberalization reforms would fail to generate the desired outcomes. The highly fragile 
growth path of many middle-income economies in the Washington Consensus era was 
based on “short-term and highly speculative inflows of capital” (Öniş and Şenses, 
2005, p. 268).. The second element that became a discernible trend was emphasis put 
on social and distributional policies to even out income inequality and improve the 
living standards of lower income segments of the society without undermining 
budgetary discipline. In effect, PWC should be considered as an edited version of 
economic orthodoxy because commitment to key elements of the neo-liberal agenda 
such as trade liberalization, financialization and mass scale privatization continued to 
be the defining parameters in this new phase (see table 1). 
 
 Table 1. Three Phases of Financial Globalization and Crises 
 
1990s: The Age of 
Washington Consensus 
 
 
2000s: The Age of Post-
Washington Consensus 
 
 
2010s: The Age of Hybridity  
 
− Hyper globalization 
policies (Washington 
Consensus) advocated 
by Bretton Woods 
institutions  
 
− The expansion of neo-
liberal globalization 
toward ex-Socialist 
states and China 
 
− Fast-burning crises 
predominantly in the 
“semi-periphery”; 
capitalist “core” 
(advanced western 
economies) remains 
robust.  
 
− US is experiencing rapid 
growth, continuing up to 
the 2008 global crisis; 
the EU’s transformative 
effect at its peak in the 
1990s and the early 
2000s. 
  
 
 
 
 
− Managed globalization 
policies putting 
emphasis on regulatory 
institutions  
 
− Crises originate from 
the “core” in the later 
part of the decade - 
“semi-periphery” 
(BRICS and other key 
emerging regional 
powers) is quite robust 
 
− Continued growth in 
BRICS and near BRICS 
at a time of crises in US 
and Europe. 
 
− Stagnation and 
multiple-crisis in 
European integration 
project 
 
 
− Mainstream liberal 
paradigm and new political 
economy paths coexist 
 
 
− Continued stagnation and 
weak growth in the “core”; 
weakening of economic 
performance in the “semi-
periphery”  
 
− Return of a new wave of 
slow-burning crises in the 
emerging markets (Brazil, 
Russia, S. Africa, Turkey 
and Argentina); increased 
differentiation within both 
the “global North” and the 
“global South.”  
 
− U.S. doing better than EU, 
northern Europe doing 
better than Southern 
Europe, China and India 
doing better than other 
BRICS or near-BRICS; 
increased fragmentation 
across countries. 
 Source: Authors’ compilation 
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From the early 1990s up until the GFC, there was an underlying continuity, which 
appeared to be quite robust. In spite of the growing challenge of China and other 
rising powers, the U.S. continued to occupy a central position in the global political 
economy. The transatlantic alliance also proved to be in strong shape. The G-7 
remained the principal locus of global governance and emerging powers did not 
succeed to reform the voting quotas in key multilateral institutions. The IMF-World 
Bank nexus maintained a dominant position in global finance, in spite of growing 
criticisms and challenges. During the 2010s, however, we witnessed the making of a 
new era where underlying elements of the PWC were increasingly contested, but have 
not been entirely replaced (Beeson and Li, 2015). The key element that makes the 
2010s striking is that, it is in many ways a more complex phase, compared to its 
predecessors: key elements of the PWC undergirding liberal international order 
continue, but, at the same time, seriously challenged by the rise of alternative political 
economy paradigms, first and foremost by Beijing Consensus, that clearly associated 
with the global power shifts towards a post-hegemonic international order. We now 
turn our attention to this third-phase of late globalization.  
 
The Political Economy of post-GFC: Fragmentation in an Age of Hybridity 
 
A decade has elapsed since the inception of the GFC. This provides a sufficient time 
frame to evaluate some of the key features of the new phase of globalization – the age 
of hybridity. The two key terms, which we think are particularly relevant in 
describing the new era, are hybrid norms and fragmented governance. First, the new 
era is marked by the absence of a dominant and coherent paradigm advocated by a 
coherent core. Second, the nature of crises in this new third-phase displays a 
strikingly distinct pattern. In this sense, the political economy of the 2010s is 
characterized by patterns of fragmentation, which is visible in a multitude of ways in 
the liberal core and non-western political economies.  
 
To start with the impact of growth has proved quite uneven in the U.S. There is strong 
evidence that top income groups have benefited disproportionately from the growth 
process, with large segments of the middle and lower-income groups being excluded 
from benefits of economic recovery. For instance, the top 1 percent income share rose 
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from 10 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 2016. The bottom 50 percent income share, 
on the other hand, decreased from more than 20 percent to 13 percent (also see figure 
1).5 This has resulted in growing polarization that unleashed serious backlash on part 
of the ‘losers’ of neoliberal globalization, especially in the post-GFC. The Trump 
phenomenon in the U.S., for instance, is closely associated with the emerging patterns 
of income inequality. Despite post-war globalization has narrowed the income 
inequality gap between core and peripheral countries, as Milanovic (2016) 
documents, the inequality within the states, has been increased in a dramatic manner. 
The bottom 90 percent of the American population, for instance, did not receive their 
fair share from economic growth, since the increase of their incomes has constantly 
fallen behind per capita GDP growth over the last three decades, leading to populist 
backlash (Leonhardt, 2019). 
 
Fragmentation has been a key feature of the post-crisis Europe as well. The Eurozone 
has been characterized by prolonged stagnation throughout the decade and overall 
recovery has been very slow to come, as the annual average growth in the Eurozone 
remained just 0.4 percent between 2009 and 2016. 6  Furthermore, the Eurozone 
debacle has magnified the traditional North-South divide in the EU. Whilst northern 
Europe has been more successful in economic terms (with strong growth in countries 
like Germany and Sweden), southern Europe been deeply affected. Greece, for 
instance, has been the principal loser with other southern European countries such as 
Italy, Spain and Portugal being deeply affected (Öniş and Kutlay 2019b, 10). The 
austerity programs implemented throughout the Eurozone have led to growing 
disparity between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ that put the liberal ethos driving the entire 
European project in jeopardy. These dislocations, in turn, have underpinned a 
powerful wave of anti-systemic movements throughout Europe, who have effectively 
capitalized on the anxieties and concerns of citizens that have been adversely affected 
by Europe’s multiple crises. The EU’s illiberal peripheral actors, supported by 
outsiders, are increasingly challenging the supremacy of the liberal core and the 
normative foundation of the post-war integration project (Öniş and Kutlay 2019b). 
Processes involving internal fragmentation and polarization in core members of the 
liberal international order now pose a major challenge to both liberal democracy and 
rule-based multilateralism.  
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Turning to the emerging world, BRICS have become principal winners of the global 
financial crisis. As a matter of fact, the institutionalization of BRICS has proceeded at 
an unexpectedly rapid rate. China and BRICS have emerged as powerful actors in the 
global arena in the context of G-20 and South-South cooperation (Stuenkel, 2016; 
Kanet, 2018). Yet, as the decade unfolded, we observe a similar pattern of 
fragmentation within BRICS as well. China and India are the two major BRICS, 
which have been able to maintain high economic growth in recent years. The annual 
average annual growth in China and India (between 2009 and 2016) materialized at 
8.3 and 7.4 percent, respectively. The economic performance of the three remaining 
BRICS, Russia (0.4 percent), Brazil (1.1 percent) and South Africa (1.6 percent), 
however, has been sluggish in the same period. 7  Brazil and South Africa, two 
important democratic BRICS, proved particularly disappointing. These two countries, 
not only experienced weak growth, but also significant political turmoil associated 
with massive corruption scandals (Phillips, Burke and Lewis, 2019). Therefore, 
uneven growth and institutional regression seems to be a feature of the non-Western 
world as well. 
 
In this new hybrid era, crises also appear to have assumed a different form. We see a 
pattern involving the return of crises back to the semi-periphery during the course of 
the 2010s. However, countries are muddling through and managing to find their ways 
out of the crisis, without experiencing a major collapse and a subsequent recourse to a 
large-scale IMF austerity program. Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and Russia are all 
samples of countries, which have been struggling, but somehow managing to avoid 
the IMF surveillance. Argentina constitutes the only major case of an emerging 
market country in the global South, which has been at the center of the IMF attention 
throughout the decade that has managed to secure a large $50 billion worth of loans 
from the IMF in return for a strict austerity program. Turkey, on the other hand, 
constitutes another interesting case. The country experienced a sharp currency crisis 
in late 2018. However, so far, Turkish policy-makers have managed to avoid the IMF 
(Daily Sabah, 2018). This pattern is certainly not unique to Turkey. Emerging powers, 
in general, increasingly enjoy more leeway in their relations with Bretton Woods 
institutions, and their bargaining leverage seems to increase as they forge new ties 
with China, Russia and other like-minded states. 
 
 14 
At the global level, the most striking example of fragmentation is associated with the 
weakening of the transatlantic alliance, which has been the very basis of the liberal 
international order. The transatlantic core has suffered a big blow following the 2016 
U.S. presidential elections. Trump’s increasingly unilateralist foreign policy and his 
deep distrust of the core elements of liberal democracy and free market economy has 
generated a deep vacuum, given the fact that the EU alone, does not have material 
capabilities to protect liberal international order in the absence of the U.S. embedding 
its hegemonic might in transatlantic alliance. For the first time, in the words of 
European Council President Donald Tusk, “an American administration is not very 
enthusiastically tuned in to a united, strong Europe” (Hayden, 2018); whereas German 
leader Angela Merkel publicly stated that Europe can’t rely “on the superpower of the 
U.S. anymore” (Gstalter, 2018). In that sense, Trump presidency has clearly helped to 
swing the pendulum in China’s favor. China, in recent years under the Presidency of 
Xi Jinping has become as a more assertive power in terms of reflecting its governance 
model at the global level, as the U.S. under Trump has increasingly withdrawn from 
its leadership role. 
 
The final decade in our three-stage analysis, the 2010s, therefore, can be decomposed 
into two distinct phases. The first phase, up until 2016, designates an interregnum 
during which the liberal core under the U.S. leadership managed to remain intact and 
presented relatively a coherent bloc against the rise of China and BRICS. Since 2016, 
however, the liberal core has experienced a process of fundamental fracturing, which 
has helped China to occupy a more central role in global governance. In a period that 
American political elites have lost commitment to free trade and rule-based 
multilateral co-operation to deal with fundamental problems multidimensional 
fragmentation becomes the defining trend in global governance. What we have is a 
new age of hybridity where co-existence of competing norms injects a high dose of 
instability, anxiety and unpredictability. What we observe, by the end of the 2010s, is 
arguably not the end of multilateralism per se, given the strong interdependence 
between advanced Western and emerging non-Western economies. What we may 
have instead, is different style multilateralism based on hybrid norms and institutional 
incoherence (see table 2). The growing role of China as a game shaper in this context 
has some fundamental ramifications regarding the way that multilateralism is likely to 
evolve. China will seek to promote more controlled approach to globalization, in line 
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with its underlying model of authoritarian capitalism. It is arguably more in the 
political rather than the economic arena that growing Chinese leadership is likely to 
make a deep impact on global political economy. Although China does not seem to 
actively export its authoritarian model of capitalism, this model is likely to become 
more attractive on a global scale, which brings democracy paradox to the fore in the 
new age of hybridity. The next sections unpack the two aspects of global governance 
to delineate the lineages of this intriguing phenomenon. 
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Table 2. A stylized comparison – Post-Washington Consensus vs. Beijing Consensus 
 Post-Washington Consensus Beijing Consensus 
 
Main paradigm  
Open globalization: emphasis on regulation in a broadly 
liberal, market oriented environment 
 
Selective globalization: managed liberalization, public-private 
partnerships, regulation of finance capital 
 
Organization of 
state-market 
relations 
Approaches to institution building 
 
Strong emphasis on the need to build an institutional basis 
for a well-functioning market economy, especially in the 
regulatory and social realms (this was a neglected feature 
of the WC). These reforms are promoted through 
conditionality practices. These institutions are seen as 
universally relevant, not unique to Western style of 
development. 
 
Emphasis on flexibility, sovereignty and evolutionary change 
through experimentation and improvisation. Chinese 
developmental model is considered to be unique, and, hence 
not a model imposed on outsiders. This is seen as an 
alternative approach to the “West”, where allegedly there is a 
top-down imposition of own model on outside world. 
Associated with a more substantive role for the state coupled 
with a strong public enterprise component in a mixed economy 
framework. 
Economic policies 
 
Policies are directly promoted through IMF, WB and EU 
conditionality; open trade (meaning ultimately free trade), 
liberal capital accounts regime; tight implementation of 
intellectual property rights; open door approach to FDI; 
privatization of public enterprises; tight budgetary 
framework, which also limits the ability to achieve large-
scale redistribution in an essentially free-market oriented 
environment. 
 
 
Open (if not free) trade; selective protectionism and 
intellectual property rights; selective open door approach to 
the TNCs/FDI through active bargaining on the terms of entry, 
selective state-led industrial policies; autonomous public 
enterprises; flexible approach to environmental protection; 
commitment to reduce poverty with direct emphasis on income 
inequality. 
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Source: Authors’ compilation
 
Approaches to 
conditionality 
 
Based on tight conditionality; vertical top-down approach 
implemented through key financial institutions; the gap 
between rhetoric and reality may be less striking. 
 
Based on the rhetoric of limited conditionality /no strings 
attached/ horizontal co-operation; in reality major initiatives 
by China may embody different forms of conditionality and 
create new forms of dependence. 
 
Role of key 
international 
organizations 
Undergirding US-dominated liberal order: Material and 
ideological dominance of the Bretton Woods institutions – 
the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization 
Instruments of dual-track counter-hegemonic strategy: (1) 
Reforming Bretton Woods institutions; (2) Forming new 
institutions – such as BRICS, Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Belt Road 
Initiative.  
Approaches to 
democracy 
Democracy is seen as an ultimate objective, but not directly 
promoted. Governance reforms, institution building and 
emphasis on rule of law are emphasized – and constitute 
indirect mechanisms for influencing economic 
development on a more democratic path. The emphasis on 
governance reforms has been declining in recent years, 
suggesting a limited degree of convergence between the 
two paradigms. The weakening of liberal democracy in the 
West and the presence of Trump like leaders also tend to 
reduce the self-confidence of Bretton Woods institutions 
and their commitment to liberal democratic norms. 
 
Neutral on regime type; emphasizes national sovereignty, 
however, engages in authoritarian promotion indirectly, by 
setting itself as a role model and providing financial assistance 
for illiberal and authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian 
promotion is also accomplished indirectly through supporting 
Russia, whose influence in the political regimes of many 
Western democracies is much more overt (i.e., election 
meddling, promotion of fake news). Furthermore regime has 
been becoming more authoritarian as China becomes more 
assertive globally and assumes a more sensitive posture to any 
criticisms from outside involving its domestic politics, which 
could seen as a contributor to its strong indirect influence and 
authoritarian bias.  
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The Benign Face of Global Governance: Democratization of Globalization? 
 
On the positive side, some features of the post-GFC global order are likely to 
contribute to the democratization of globalization process. Global governance has 
become, at least on the surface, more participatory and pluralistic. G-7 used to be the 
dominant forum in the pre-crisis era. In the new, post-crisis environment G-20 has 
replaced G-7 as the main platform of decision-making on key global governance 
issues. The growing importance of G-20 meant that new actors, notably key emerging 
powers, have become more assertive in the global arena (Payne, 2010; Wade, 2011). 
The non-Western powers pursue a “dual-track strategy” towards establishing a more 
pluralistic international order (Hurrell, 2018). First, these states are now better 
represented at existing international institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank and 
the WTO, despite reforms fell short of expectations. Second, emerging powers are 
investing in a set of new governance institutions. BRICS summits, the New 
Development Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank constitute some vivid examples of new institutions and alliance 
structures, which are playing an increasingly critical role in a post-Western 
international order. Indeed, some of the new institutions emerging under the auspices 
of China and BRICS appear to be more inclusive in terms of their governance 
structures compared to the existing Western dominated institutions. We observe, for 
example, a pattern of rotating presidencies in G-20, BRICS, and the New 
Development Bank. In contrast, the presidential position at the World Bank continues 
to be a political appointee by the U.S., whilst a key European figure is typically 
appointed to the Executive Director position at the IMF. Given the fact that 
American-led post-war international order has been restrained to the West and limited 
in terms of geographical scope the dual track strategy of non-Western powers is likely 
to contribute to the democratization of globalization.  
 
The rise of China and other major emerging powers have also created new 
opportunities and much-needed policy space for the developing world, presenting a 
powerful challenge to the monopoly of the key Bretton Woods institutions. The 
challenge of the Beijing Consensus implied a more flexible approach to governance in 
key areas such as trade, developmental aid, intellectual property rights, reform of 
public enterprises, currency reform, and environmental protectionism (Güven, 2018). 
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Low or middle-income countries benefit from the opportunities offered by the rise of 
China and other major non-Western powers. Seen this way, the key institutions of the 
previously dominant order appear to be more open to new ideas and practices, clearly 
reflecting the rise of China and the BRICS (Güven, 2017). There seems to be a 
growing rejection of one-size-fits-all principle and greater willingness to embrace a 
more flexible understanding of conditionality. The IMF, for instance, seems to be 
much more concerned with issues relating to pervasive income and wealth inequality. 
Similarly, by suggesting that “capital flow management measures can be useful”, it 
seems to develop some propensity to consider unconventional policies such as 
controls over short-term capital movements (IMF, 2012, p. 2).  
 
On a final note, G-20 provided an institutional framework for coordinated action, 
which helped to facilitate the global economic recovery in the aftermath of the GFC. 
Without this kind of collective agenda of co-operation, the impact of the crisis could 
have been much worse. A comparison with the Great Depression of the 1930s, where 
this type of institutional co-operation was totally lacking, with its dire consequences, 
would be particularly striking in this context (Helleiner, 2010; Wolf, 2015; Tooze, 
2018). Furthermore, one should not underestimate the extent of the progress in key 
governance areas, such as environmental protection and climate change, where there 
exist major clash of interests between global North and global South. The fact that 
there was agreement on the UN Summit on Environment in Paris where all the key 
actors displayed commitment to the key principles of the Paris Agreement signed in 
2016, with the notable exception of the U.S., constitutes significant progress.  
 
The Dark Side of Global Governance: Globalization of Illiberalism? 
 
There are a number of features of the emerging global order, which would challenge 
the broadly benign picture associated with democratization of globalization. To start 
with, the skeptics would make two quite distinct points: First, G-20, whilst being a 
broader entity compared to G-7, continues to be a club of powerful states, including 
both established and emerging powers. Yet this club fails to adequately represent the 
needs of a large group of developing states, which fall outside the orbit of G-20 
(Payne, 2010). Second, and perhaps more striking element concerns the degree of 
representation within the G-20 itself. Is G-20 increasingly dominated by two 
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superpowers, the U.S. and China – the so called ‘G2’ or ‘Chimerica’ (Beeson and Li, 
2015, pp. 99-100), where many of the key states such as the European countries or 
other regional powers find themselves in the position of passive followers rather than 
key decision-making actors in an increasingly bi-polar global order? 
 
This point is also relevant to the discussions relating to the future of BRICS. Whether 
BRICS would evolve into a broad-based horizontal coalition of like-minded states in 
promoting a multi-order world or whether China’s dominance within BRICS 
grouping would shape the main parameters of post-liberal international order is still 
unclear. We know that Chinese leadership is interested in BRICS enlargement 
through “BRICS plus model,” as the BRICS summit held in Johannesburg in July 
2018 clearly testify (also see, Xinhua, 2017). Representatives from a number of 
emerging powers have been invited as observers and countries like Turkey may opt to 
join if opportunities arise in the future. The key question, however, is even if BRICS 
enlargement takes place, are we likely to observe a European style core-periphery 
structure (China-Russia axis similar to the Franco-German axis versus other BRICS 
similar to the Eastern periphery in the EU). There is no doubt that this kind of vertical 
restructuring of the BRICS, even if it were to emerge, are likely to generate 
significant resistance and further frictions within the already heterogeneous group 
(Nölke et al 2019; Casanova and Kassum, 2014). For instance, India has been rather 
uncomfortable with China’s growing hegemonic position in Asia and displayed a 
significant degree of skepticism regarding the BRI. Similarly, Brazil has been rather 
concerned about China’s growing power and influence in Latin America. Also, one 
may question the robustness of the China-Russia alliance given the economic and 
geopolitical asymmetries and Russia’s concerns about increasing Chinese dominance 
in the post-Soviet space, especially in relation to the oil rich central Asian republics, 
which Moscow considers its immediate sphere of interest.  
 
The main feature of the age of hybridity involves the presence of intense geo-political 
rivalries between powerful states, constituting a serious challenge to international co-
operation. The recent Syrian crisis offers a strong testimony to the strong come back 
of geopolitical conflicts and proxy wars. The international community failed to 
respond to the one of the major human tragedies of our age, due to conflicting 
interests on part of the key states involved. Arguably, we find ourselves in a fragile 
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equilibrium rife with inter-state conflicts and rivalries, rather reminiscent of the 
conflict-ridden international system of the inter-war era. This kind of environment not 
only weakens the impulse to reinforce rule-based co-operation but also contributes to 
growing insecurity and uncertainty itself, as powerful states are likely to invest in 
armament and military aggrandizement. This picture is very much in line with our 
notion of fragmented multilateralism, which embodies elements of transactionalist co-
operation and frequent discord simultaneously.  
 
What we observe in the post-GFC world is the proliferation of flexible, 
intergovernmental and loosely institutionalized network organizations (Cooper and 
Farooq, 2013). In G-20 or similar style BRICS summits a pattern of decision-making 
emerges that is dominated by a process of individualized interaction between 
powerful leaders of key states, which tends to weaken multilateral governance 
institutions. The strongmen in several states tend to distrust and increasingly by-pass 
international institutions. This tendency has been particularly striking in the case of 
Trump administration, where the president has displayed considerable skepticism not 
only towards domestic institutional check and balances, but also to key international 
institutions. The power and influence of the UN in particular, appears to have 
declined dramatically at a time when it is most needed to tackle truly global problem 
ranging from counter-terrorism, irregular migration and transnationalized civil wars. 
The growing dominance of informal governance in key international settings such as 
the annual G-20 meetings and BRICS summits points towards fundamental 
democratic deficits in the context of global practice. At a rather superficial level, the 
transition from G-7 to G-20 signifies a process of democratizing globalization, 
through a more pluralistic global order. At a more fundamental level, however, major 
questions are raised about the democratic credentials of a process of informal 
deliberation, which takes place through the interaction between strongmen regimes, 
lacking transparency and accountability.  
 
The key argument of this article is that we need to explore the domestic sources of 
this emergent fragmentation in global governance as well, which brings democracy 
paradox to the fore: The post-GFC political-economic developments undergirding 
democratization of globalization have not been accompanied with the expansion of 
pluralist political regimes across the world. On the contrary, the resilience of illiberal 
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regimes in different forms and the breakdown of democracies in several countries 
enfeebled benign expectations about the spread of liberal democracy (Foa, 2018; 
Levitsky and Way 2010). In the post-GFC equilibrium, where democratic efficacy 
recedes, authoritarian models of capitalism pose a fundamental challenge to 
democratic capitalism. All recent indicators point to the expansion of illiberal 
regimes. 8  For instance, the countries rated “not free” (Freedom House’s lowest 
category) made up 12 percent of global income in 1990. This ratio skyrocketed to 33 
percent today, “matching the level they achieved in the early 1930s, during the rise of 
fascism in Europe, and surpassing the heights they reached in the Cold War when 
Soviet power was at its apex” (Mounk and Foa 2018, p. 30). Also, the share of “not 
free” countries increased from 22.3 percent to 25.1 percent over the last decade 
(Freedom House, 2018). As figure 2 shows, in the post-2009, the number of countries 
with net declines in freedom scores doubled those that experienced net improvement. 
The rise of illiberal strongman regimes poses fundamental questions about the 
democratic nature of the key decision-making processes.  
 
Figure 2. Number of countries with net declines in freedom scores 
Source: Freedom House, 2018. 
 
Democracy paradox, as formulated in this article, has two interrelated dimensions. 
The pre-GFC phase of US-led liberal international order underpinned by profound 
inequalities, hierarchical approach to emerging powers, and limited opportunities for 
states from the global South to be represented on an equal footing at key global 
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governance institutions (Acharya, 2018; Payne, 2010). As Acharya (2017, p. 271) 
puts it liberal international order was “hardly benign for many countries in the 
developing world, [therefore] it should be seen as a limited international order, rather 
than an inclusive global order.” From a domestic point of view, however, 
“uncontested supremacy of the United States in the last two decades spurred a robust 
wave of democratization” (Boix 2011, 827; also see Fukuyama, 1992). The share of 
“free” countries, for instance, increased from 42.4 to 46.6 percent in a decade just 
before the GFC. The number of “not free” countries, on the other hand, decreased to 
22.3 percent in 2007 from 27.2 percent in 1997 (Freedom House, 2018).9 The “near-
universal” appeal of liberal democracy even led some scholars to describe it as a 
“world value” in global politics (McFaul, 2004, p. 148).  
 
The emergent hybrid international system and fragmented multilateralism, therefore, 
is closely associated with domestic political developments toward a variety of illiberal 
regimes. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to demonstrate the exact 
causal relationship between these two interrelated trends, democracy paradox 
constitutes a key but under-explored aspect of the age of hybridity. That being said, 
the spread of illiberalism in the post-GFC era is not a straightforward process 
reflecting a linear path. In several countries, China’s increasing influence is received 
with skepticism and even with resistance. Africa is an illustrative case in point. 
Ambrosio (2012, p. 394) notes that the attractiveness of China in the African 
continent as an investment and trade partner should not be conflated with its appeal as 
a “model of economic and political development.” The African policy-makers are 
“turning to China primarily for its ‘no strings’ investment and trade policies […] 
rather than the Chinese political-economic model” (Ambrosio, 2012, p. 394). The 
massive infrastructure projects as part of China’s $1 trillion BRI – Beijing’s grand 
geo-economic strategy of revitalizing historic trading routes between Asia and Europe 
– are now under fire due to the growing concerns that it gives way to “depth-trap 
diplomacy” (Chellaney, 2017). It is estimated that China loaned “some $143bn to 
African governments and state-owned enterprises between 2000 and 2017” (quoted in 
Strauss, 2018). In effect, China’s investments in strategic sectors and regions lead to 
accumulation of huge amounts of debts in some of the target countries, pushing them 
in a debt spiral (Strauss, 2018). China’s reception in the global South therefore seems 
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to be mixed, reflecting both opportunities and new forms of dependence, which is 
very much in line with the main characteristics of the age of hybridity. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The global financial crisis has undermined the very foundations of the liberal 
international order in which the U.S. embedded its hegemony. However, the liberal 
order has not been replaced. What we observe is a new era of competing norms in an 
increasingly post-liberal and post-Western world. The rise of China and the Beijing 
Consensus is likely to play a constitutive role in this emerging system, with profound 
economic and political ramifications – especially given the fact that recent 
developments cast doubt on “China’s peaceful rise commitment” (Zeng, 2017). 
China’s influence is especially on the rise following the American retreat during the 
Trump presidency. China, under the leadership of Jinping, has become more 
authoritarian at home and more assertive in the international arena.  
 
The growing role of China and BRICS will not mean the end of multilateralism, but 
different style multilateralism. Powerful states, both advanced industrialized 
economies of the global North and the emerging powers of the global South are 
deeply interdependent and have fundamental economic and security interests, which 
will create incentives for multidimensional co-operation. However, co-operation will 
take place in the midst of significant frictions, as the recent trade and technology wars 
constitute part and parcel of geo-economic rifts (The Economist, 2018). In the 
incoming age of hybridity, we may increasingly observe the emergence of a 
fragmented multilateral order based on principles of flexibility and sovereignty as 
opposed to a tight rule-based multilateralism informed by normative coherence and 
institutional complementary. 
 
A central question to ask in this context is whether the Beijing Consensus would be 
synonymous with ‘BRICS Consensus.’ Our major contention is that BRICS, as a 
winner of the GFC have become more important actors over the course of the decade 
despite significant challenges they encounter in their domestic affairs. All major 
BRICS are in key respects share the Chinese agenda of challenging exclusive nature 
of liberal international order constituted under American/Western dominance. They 
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want to contribute to a multipolar world and new style multilateralism based on the 
principles of flexibility and sovereignty. Hence, there are valid grounds for equating 
Beijing Consensus with the BRICS Consensus, with the qualification that major 
BRICS, India in particular, has different concerns about China’s rise. Seen this way, 
there is a striking difference in terms of prevalent norms between the more 
authoritarian members of the club – China and Russia – and democratic BRICS – 
India, Brazil, and South Africa (Öniş and Gençer 2018). Arguably, however, the 
difference between the authoritarian and democratic BRICS has been significantly 
blurred in recent years. The democratic BRICS, Brazil, India, and South Africa, have 
been experiencing serious political and economic crises at home, which severely 
undermine the role model capabilities of these countries. The weakening of their 
democratic credentials would suggest that these countries are likely to put economic 
and security interests at the forefront of their foreign policies. The emerging trend 
within BRICS implies that Chinese authoritarian capitalism and expansion of 
illiberalism constitute a major challenge as part of the democracy paradox in the 
current era. 
 
In conclusion, the weakening of liberal international order and the rise of authoritarian 
capitalism operate as mutually reinforcing processes. The waning of pluralist regimes 
in the heartland of liberal democracy and growing influence of authoritarian 
capitalism has implications for patterns of global governance. The new international 
order appears to be superficially more pluralistic compared to pre-GFC global 
governance regime. At the same, global governance is characterized by fundamental 
democratic deficits, very much in line with the weakening of democratic systems in 
their domestic spheres. The contest is increasingly between authoritarian capitalism 
versus flawed democracies – with its northern and southern varieties. Whether flawed 
democracies will have the capacity to reform their institutional structures constitutes a 
major challenge for the emerging trends in a post-hegemonic international order. 
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Notes 
 
1 Indeed, the way that the country has been able to deal with its recent corruption scandal constitutes a 
clear testimony to the strength of democratic institutions in the contemporary South Korean setting. 
BBC, “South Korea's Presidential Scandal”, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
37971085 (last visited on 6 December 2018).  
2 For an in-depth analysis of state-market relations in China, see Kurlantzick (2016). 
3 The data is retrieved from World Bank database. 
4 World Bank was faster than the IMF in terms of self-evaluation and intra-organizational critique. The 
oft-cited and widely debated World Bank report that underlined the importance of regulatory 
institutions and state’s steering role, for instance, published in 1997. See World Bank (1997).     
5 Data retrieved from World Inequality Database, https://wid.world/data/.   
6 Data retrieved from United Nations, World Economic Situation, 2018, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-
content/uploads/sites/45/publication/WESP2018_Full_Web-1.pdf (last accessed on 1 January 2019). 
7 Ibid. 
8 We define illiberal regimes “as a broad-based ideology and worldview that embodies a spectrum of 
hybrid regimes ranging from electoral democracy to full authoritarianism” (Öniş and Kutlay 2019b, 2). 
For an early discussion on illiberal democracy, see Zakaria (1997).   
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